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but not for quality. But its recipient

must abide by the finality of his labor,

or lack of it. No grades can be raised

after they are once handed in. It re-

mains to work out a set of checks, such

as the penalizing of an undue number

of D, as well as E grades.

As the D grade corresponds in the

main to the former condition, so does

the E to the "not passed." Yet an in-

creased strictness may reasonably be

expected. Thus the grade E will prob-

ably be assigned to many formerly
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given a heavy condition, as well as to

those formerly not passed. So, too, the

grade D will include the rest of those

formerly conditioned, together with

those who were close to the line, but

were at the last moment passed,

through mercy—or faint-heartedness.

Many other benefits may be expect-

ed to accrue as experience guides.

Thus the permission to carry a num-

ber of hours in excess of the normal

maximum may well be based on the de-

gree of excellence attained by the ap-

plicant during the preceding semester.

It is hoped that the system may re-

sult in raising the standards of schol-

arship. The new scheme has been fav-

orably commented upon by many un-

dergraduates. The Faculty are pleased

at being able to express their recogni-

tion of the difference between a stu-

dent of undeniably good parts and one-

who passes by the skin of his teeth, and

they rejoice at the opportunity to tell

the truth with some degree of discrim-

ination.

Arthur G. Hall, '87.

THE ART OF LEGAL PRACTICE

1.

In one respect the law is the most

perplexing subject with which a man

can deal. It shifts and changes so rap-

idly that only a nimble and diligent

student can keep abreast of it. One is

likely to wake up any morning and

find that the legislature has repealed a

good part of what he knows, and he

is in constant danger of having his

most carefully formed opinions com-

pletely upset by a new decision of the

Supreme Court. These violent changes

are not due to any new discoveries,

such as constantly enliven the scien-

tific world, but merely to the shifting

sentiment of legislative bodies and to

the powerful influence of a certain va-

riable element which enters into every

legal equation. The legislative inno-

vations are in a sense extrinsic factors.

But the judicial "variable," if we may

use the term, is an innate condition,

and every judicial opinion may be con-

sidered a function of that variable.

A casual glance through the current

1912]

255

THE ART OF LEGAL PRACTICE

States are most of them taken from

the United States Circuit Court of Ap-

peal and from the highest courts of the

states. The judges of these courts,

then, who reverse lower judges so of-

ten, are in turn reversed with almost

equal frequency. The Appellate Divis-

ion in New York, as shown above, al-

lowed the trial judges an average of

but 30 per cent of correct solutions of

the cases carried up on appeal or er-

ror, while these appellate judges them-

selves were admitted to be correct in
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but 37 per cent of the cases which were

carried up to the Court of Appeals.

The truth is that there is no such

thing as a "single correct solution" for

every legal problem. Two judges may

take opposite positions on a given case

and both be right. Each is right from

his own point of view.

The majority of cases which cause

difficulty in the courts are not those

which deal with mooted legal princi-

ples. The principles of the law are

largely settled. The leading cases, the

elementary text-books and the state

and federal statutes are open to every-

one, and in these the principles of the

law are stated in language which us-

ually admits of no serious question.

But the great problem which haunts

the lawyer and haunts the court is:

Which of these legal principles con-

trols the case in hand? The facts may

be simple, the rules of law may be few

and clear, but the case may be one up-

on which able judges may be hopeless-

ly at variance.

A very interesting example of this

may be found in a recent decision of

the Supreme Court of the United

States. A statute of the state of Iowa

provided that the shares of stock of

state and savings banks should be as-

sessed to such banks and not to the in-

dividual stockholders. Plaintiff bank

held, as a part of its capital, certain

bonds of the United States, and, in

making the assessment under the stat-

ute, the assessor did not deduct the

amount of these bonds. Plaintiff con-

tended that in this way a tax was really

levied by the state upon United States

bonds. The Supreme Court of Iowa

sustained the defendant, the City of

Des Moines. The Supreme Court of

the United States sustained the plain-

tiff, the Home Savings Bank. There

were no facts in dispute. Both courts

admitted that to levy a tax upon Uni-

ted States securities was beyond the

power of the state. Both admitted that

there was a distinction between capital

stock and shares of stock, the former

being the property of the corporation,

the latter being the property of the cor-
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many cases which bring out a sharp

conflict in judicial opinion as to fun-

damental legal principles. But these

cases are comparatively few. By far

the greater number of legal controver-

sies involve the application of well-

known principles. It is this class of

cases which confuses lawyers and puz-

zles courts.

Law is, in truth, both a science and

an art, but chiefly the latter. It might

be called an applied science. To know

the law for the sake of knowing it is
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the harmless desire of a studious mind,

but to know the law for the sake of

using it is the high ambition which

makes great lawyers. A man merely

learned in the law is not a lawyer, and

reading will hardly make him one. Un-

less he views the law, not as a body of

collected wisdom, but as the practical

means by which society is regulated in

its every-day affairs, he lacks the chief

requisite for a successful career at the

bar.

If knowledge of the law is valuable,

not for itself but for its usefulness, law

should be taught, not as an end in it-

self, but as a means to an end. The

student should be taught the art of

applying legal principles to facts. Of

course the application cannot be made

until the data have been obtained, and

perhaps the major part of the time of

the law school student should be spent

in acquiring a working knowledge of

legal principles. There is no occasion

for him to attempt to master the sub-

stantive law. No lawyer can carry the

law in his head, but he carries enough

there to enable him to see the legal

bearing of the facts of cases which are

presented to him. He knows enough

to find the rest. But the bare knowl-

edge of what the law is constitutes the

least part of the lawyer's equipment.

Let it be assumed that one has be-

come reasonably familiar with the ele-

ments of the various branches of the

law. Diligence in reading text-books

or hearing lectures has given him the

necessary information. Up to that

point he has studied law as a science.

But law as a science is abstract, and

tends to become more and more so as

it approaches its theoretical ideal. The

scientist seeks constantly for unity, and

in doing so he is obliged to sacrifice

content to form. Law as a pure sci-

ence is no more vital a subject than

such a science as astronomy. Both at-

tempt to classify and unify a group of

related facts, but in each case the goal

is reached when the classification is

worked out. If the student stops here

he has little to show for his labor.

As a fact, law as a science is so
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order to determine their controlling

force, analyzed and applied precedents,

and at last, out of the chaos of law and

fact, brought a clear solution of the

problem.

The value of the use of cases in

teaching law has become thoroughly

recognized in American law schools.

Law as an art can hardly be taught

without them, for there is nothing

more essential for developing facility

in the practice of any art than the use

of good models. One would hardly be
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expected to become a good musical

composer without a thorough study of

the musical master-pieces. The best

and almost the only way to acquire lit-

erary style is through the study of

good prose. In equal measure is the

study of cases essential to develop that

skill in analyzing and handling legal

controversies which marks the good

lawyer.

But why stop with the study of

cases? The student of composition

tries his hand at actual writing. No-

body thinks that a study of models is

enough. Why not give the student of

law a chance to try his hand at prac-

tice?

Only two reasons suggest them-

selves for excluding practice from the

law school course. One is that it is

practically impossible to teach it. This

may be dismissed with the remark that

it has been done and is now being done

with unquestioned success. The other

is that practice has no proper place in

a law school.

If practice ought not to appear as

one of the features of legal instruction

it is either because if it is of no im-

portance in itself or because it would

diminish the time available for other

more important subjects. Both of

these reasons have been given; they are

equally invalid.

It is most commonly said, by those

who oppose the teaching of practice in

the law schools, that the student will

get hold of practice readily enough

when he gets into the active work of

his profession. So will the writer get

plenty of experience in writing when

he takes up the career of a literary

man. So will the engineer have abun-

dant opportunity to do practical work

when he begins his career as an engi-

neer.

There is no essential difference in

the relation which practice bears to the

study of law and that which composi-

tion bears to the study of literary style.

The efficiency of the student must be

measured by his ability to write in the

one case and to practice in the other.

He may know how writing ought to
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ers. One might become a well-inform-

ed rhetorician, or even a clever critic

of style, and yet be unable to write well

himself. But one can never become

proficient in doing anything by merely

watching others do it. A course in

pedagogy never made a good teacher.

The aim of the law schools ought to

be to develop good lawyers so far as

their means will allow. The lawyer is

essentially a practitioner, and the

schools must therefore aim to do what

they can to prepare men for practice.
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Of course the student will learn far

more in the future years of his active

career than the school can teach him.

But if he goes to the law school to

learn how to practice law, the law

school should go as far as possible in

teaching him the thing he wants to

know. It should teach him the ele-

mentary principles of the law; it should

go further, and show him, by the study

of cases how the great lawyers wrestled

with and solved the problems of the

law; and it should, finally, give him

problems to solve for himself, and

should watch, direct and criticise

through all the stages of the case, help-

ing him to appreciate and understand

the difficulties, and teaching him, by

actual experience, how to avoid pitfalls

and reach the desired results.

The mere scholar is disheartened

over the uncertainties of the law. For

him they mark imperfection and incom-

pleteness, and he looks forward to the

time when legal standards will be so

far perfected that the answers to legal

problems may be worked out with ac-

curacy and precision. He would apply

the close logic of the mathematician to

the facts and law of the case, and

would have the correct result follow

invariably from correct premises. The

lawyer knows better. He understands

that there is no absolute standard pos-

sible; that reversed cases and dissent-

ing opinions only emphasize the human

element in legal controversies; that

two judges may differ diametrically

and neither be wrong; that right and

wrong, as applied to the solution of

legal problems, are purely relative

terms.

II.

With a view to realizing the many

advantages incident to the study of

practice in the law school, the Univer-

sity of Michigan, in 1893, introduced

a department known as the Practice

Court. It was at first largely an ex-

periment, and the labor involved in de-

veloping it into a systematic and prac-

ticable mechanism for teaching prac-

tice was enormous. There were no

models to study, for no enterprise sim-
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class. This statement is an informal

recital of facts very similar to that

which a client would give a lawyer

when consulting him about his case.

It contains evidence, immaterial mat-

ter and conclusions mingled with the

ultimate facts of the case in such a

way that close discrimination must be

exercised in analyzing and segregating

the essential elements of the cause of

action. And with the facts constitut-

ing the plaintiff's case are those which

are to be relied upon by the defendant.
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The whole story is told, out of which

an action arid its incidents spring.

Each student is required to take this

statement of facts and draw a com-

plete set of pleadings based on the sit-

uation therein disclosed, raising the

meritorious issue or issues in the case.

He may follow the rules of any juris-

diction he chooses, and his pleadings

will be judged by the standards of that

jurisdiction. The pleadings so drawn

are filed on a given day, and are then

carefully examined with a view to dis-

covering and classifying the blunders

that have been made. These errors are

noted and, after the examination of

the entire lot of pleadings filed, a num-

ber of sets of pleadings drawn under

the common law system and a number

drawn under the code system, chosen

for the purpose of exhibiting the great-

est variety of mistakes, are selected as

illustrative pleadings for study. Mim-

eograph copies of each set are made,

and each man in the class receives cop-

ies of the common law or the code sets

of pleadings, according as he has chos-

en a venue where the practice is based

on common law or code rules.

Each man is required to study these

illustrative sets of pleadings, compare

them with the pleadings he himself

drew on the same facts, look up all

questions involved, criticize them un-

sparingly and rigidly, and be prepared

for a thorough and exhaustive quiz on

the whole subject of the proper man-

ner of pleading in the given case and

the specific mistakes shown in the illus-

trative pleadings. The men are divided

into convenient and appropriate sec-

tions to facilitate the quiz work. Not

only are all the noteworthy errors ap-

pearing in the illustrative pleadings

pointed out and discussed, but the

whole list of mistakes made by the

class is, so far as possible, presented

for comment and criticism. The aim is

to make thequiz comprehensive enough

to cover all the principal errors which

the inexperienced pleader finds it pos-

sible to make.

After this thoroughgoing discussion

each man in the class is required to
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fenses, the theory and form of differ-

ent counts, pleas in bar and in abate-

ment, the scope and purpose of demur-

rers, inconsistent defenses, the scope

of the general issues and the general

denial, duplicity, departure,—all these

and a great number of similar questions

are concretely illustrated by the work

of the men themselves, and the discus-

sions in regard to them have nothing

of the vague and abstract obscurity

which the theoretical study of pleading

cannot entirely escape.
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After this preliminary work in

pleading the Practice Court work

proper is taken up. The men in the

class arrange themselves into groups

of four, two to represent the plaintiff

in the case and two to represent the de-

fendant. They choose whatever juris-

diction they wish for the venue of their

case. To each group is then given out

a statement of facts similar in its scope

and purpose to those upon which the

preliminary work in pleading was

based, though no two groups receive

the same facts. These cases cover a

large variety of questions and are so

prepared as to involve disputed ques-

tions of law, or difficult applications of

legal principles. The merits of the is-

sue in each case are to be determined

by the general weight of authority, but

all questions of pleading and practice

are to be determined by the rules, stat-

utes and decisions of the state of

venue.

Process in each case is first to be

prepared, issued, served and returned

under the direction of the attorneys

for the plaintiff, after which the plead-

ings follow in clue course. The Prac-

tice Court rules provide that if a mis-

take exists in any process or pleading,

and no exception is taken to it by the

opposing attorneys, the latter as well

as those who committed the error are

to be held responsible for it, and the

court sits several afternoons each week

to hear and determine all motions and

demurrers that may be brought before

it. The process and pleadings are us-

ually examined and searched for er-

rors with care and discrimination, and

the multitude of motions and demur-

rers brought on for hearing in the

Practice Court covers a wide range of

questions and frequently develops diffi-

cult and intricate points of pleading

and practice.

In these arguments there is nothing

of fiction. The question is always an

actual one arising upon actual plead-

ings or process. The objections are

based upon the statutes, rules of court

and decisions of the state wherein the

venue of the action is laid. The objec-
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After the men assigned to a given

case deem the same at proper issue on

the pleadings, they file notes of issue

to indicate that fact, and the pleadings

filed are then carefully examined by

the instructor in charge. He then

meets the group and the pleadings are

discussed and criticized and sugges-

tions are made as to better methods of

dealing with the case and ways of

avoiding errors. Amended pleadings

are frequently required to be prepared

and filed, and upon the pleadings as
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they stand in their final form a law

argument is based.

The law argument is made before

some member of the Faculty; it con-

sumes from one to two hours, and

covers the issues raised by the plead-

ings. Each man must take part in the

argument and must show familiarity

with the facts and principles involved

in the leading cases cited. The men

representing each side of the contro-

versy are also required to present, at

the close of the argument, a compre-

hensive brief upon the law of the case,

prepared with care in the manner us-

ual in the case of briefs filed in our

appellate courts, in accordance with

somewhat detailed suggestions which

are distributed to the men in printed

form when the facts are given out.

The men are graded upon their argu-

ments and upon their briefs, and if

they do not attain a sufficient standard

in either one a reargument or a new

brief may be called for.

The foregoing represents the work

of the first semester. The second se-

mester is devoted largely to court work

in jury cases. This work involves the

trial of issues of fact, and the funda-

mental practical problem underlying it

consists in the creation of the issues to

be tried. In the work of the first semes-

ter statements of assumed facts are pre-

pared, and these exactly meet the re-

quirements, for the purpose is to raise

issues of law, not of fact, and the trial

is to the court and not to the jury. But

when it is desired to produce an issue

•f fact no assumptions can be made,

for that which is assumed cannot be an

issue. Equally ineffectual is the meth-

od of coaching witnesses before the

trial as to what they will say on the

witness stand, for while the direct ex-

amination of the various witnesses

might develop contradictions and in-

consistencies, there would be absolute-

ly no field for cross-examination. A

jury trial can be of value to the student

participating in it only when it pre-

sents the elements of actual litigation,

viz., the existence of actual controver-

sies respecting which concrete issues
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and attorneys in the various cases, so

that they have an opportunity to view

the proceedings from the witness

stand, the jury box and the attorneys'

table and to observe how their class-

mates conduct themselves in those

same positions. Each jury is impan-

elled in accordance with the practice of

the state of venue, and under that same

practice witnesses are sworn and evi-

dence is introduced, motions for non-

suits or directed verdicts are made, in-

structions are drawn and submitted to
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the jury, arguments are made and the

verdict is rendered. Every element of

the actual trial is present except the

pecuniary interest of the parties to the

suit.

Such are the main features of the

work of teaching practice as it has

been developed at the University of

Michigan. It has not reached the fin-

ished stage in all its details, for the

problem is a very large one. Every

year sees alterations and improve-

ments. The sole aim is to get results,

rather than to justify any particular

method. The Practice Court supplants

no courses in the substantive law, it

does not take the place of a thorough

study of the theory of pleading, it does

not even exhaust the attention given

to practice itself, for a course in Trial

Practice is simultaneously given. But

it does attempt to give a concrete fla-

vor to the work of the law student, to

present legal problems to be solved as

a lawyer is expected to solve them, to

enable the student to judge of the val-

ue of cases by actually using them, and

to appreciate the function and mean-

ing of the principles of substantive law

by putting them into practice.

The lawyer, like the engineer, is a

professional man with whom knowl-

edge is but a means to a practical end.

If he cannot use his knowledge it is of

no value to him. He can never appre-

ciate what he knows until he learns

how to use it; he can never know how

to acquire knowledge until he under-

stands how his knowledge is to be em-

ployed. It is to round out the law

school curriculum into a practical as

well as a theoretical course, to supple-

ment the case system in making the

law concrete, and to develop the study

of law as a science which is primarily

to be applied to the needs of a complex

society, that the teaching of practice

has taken a prominent place in the Law

Department of the University of Mich-

igan.

Edson R. Sunderland. '97, '01/.
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